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The Legacy of 'Two Dogmas' 
 
 W.  V.  Quine  is  famous,  or  perhaps  infamous,  for  his  repudiation  of  the 
analytic/synthetic distinction and kindred dualisms – the necessary/contingent dichotomy 
and the a priori/a posteriori dichotomy.  As these dualisms have come back into vogue in 
recent years, it might seem that the denial of the dualisms is no part of Quine’s enduring 
legacy. Such a conclusion is unwarranted – not only because the dualisms are deeply 
problematic, but because ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ haunts even those who want to 
retain them.  ‘Two Dogmas’ reconfigured the philosophical terrain and issued a challenge 
to philosophy’s self understanding – a challenge that has yet to be fully met. 
The commitment to the analytic/synthetic distinction derives from the recognition 
that the truth of any sentence depends on two things: the way the world is and what the 
sentence means.  It seems natural then that each sentence should be subject to a sort of 
factor analysis that disentangles the contribution of language to its truth value from the 
contribution of world.  Just how much each contributes varies from one sentence to the 
next.  When the contribution of the world goes to zero, the sentence is analytic.  Its truth 
value  depends  on  its  meaning  alone.    On  the  face  of  it,  this  says  nothing  about 
metaphysics or epistemology; it is merely a statement about semantics.  So to see the 
significance of denying that sentences admit of such factorization requires recalling how 
Quine’s predecessors thought the dualisms hang together.  According to Soames, they 
believed that  
all  necessary  and  a  priori  truths  are  analytic,  and  it  is  only  because  they  are 
analytic that they are necessary and a priori.  For (the early) Wittgenstein, the 
source of this view lay in his contention that for a sentence to say anything, for it   
to provide any information, is for its truth to exclude certain possible states that 
the world could be in.  Since necessary truths exclude nothing, they say nothing, 
and since they say nothing about the way the world is, the way the world is makes 
no  contribution  to  their  being  true.    Hence  their  truth  must  be  due  to  their 
meanings alone.  For positivists, all knowledge about the world is dependent on 
observation and sense experience.  It follows that since a priori truths can be 
known independent of observation and sense experience, they must not be about 
the world; and if they don’t tell us anything about the world, their truth must be 
due to their meanings alone.  Given the background assumption that all and only a 
priori truths are necessary, the positivists saw their identification of the a priori 
with the analytic as coinciding with Wittgenstein’s identification of the necessary 
with the analytic.  (Soames, 353-354). 
Thus readers of 'Two Dogmas' thought that discrediting the analytic/synthetic distinction 
would undermine a lot more than a theory about the meanings of words.  It also at least 
hints at why, if analyticity is abandoned, it will be difficult to ground necessity and a 
priority.    ‘Two  Dogmas’  was  alarming  (or  liberating)  not  just  for  philosophers  of 
language,  but  for  all  philosophers  concerned  with  what  is  necessary,  or  a  priori  – 
concerned, that is, with what holds or is knowable independently of the way the world is.  
That is  just about all philosophers. 
One consequence was an identity crisis.  Prior to ‘Two Dogmas’, there was a 
reasonably clear division of labor: science did the empirical work and philosophy did the 
a  priori  work.    If  the  analytic/synthetic  distinction  is  disavowed,  what  is  left  for 
philosophy to do?  In confronting this question, it is important to recall that Quine did not   
just repudiate analyticity; he did not argue that all sentences are synthetic.  He repudiated 
the distinction.  So apart from the fact that philosophers are more likely than scientists to 
read Quine, there is no obvious reason why philosophers should be more shaken than 
scientists.    It  is  equally  reasonable  to  ask,  ‘If  nothing  is  purely  a  matter  of  mind 
independent fact, what is left for science to do?’  No one asks that question.    
  Although 'Two Dogmas' did not plunge empirical science into paroxysms of self-
doubt,  it  is  worth  emphasizing  that  Quine’s  argument  does  not  especially  undermine 
philosophy.    If  it  is  sound,  the  argument  undermines  the  supposed  relation  between 
philosophy and science (and, arguably, other disciplines as well).  A philosophy that 
accommodates Quine would not be the underlaborer to science that Locke hoped his 
philosophy would be.  The question remains: What would it be?  How should philosophy 
understand itself and its mission?  What resources can it draw on?  These questions lie at  
the heart of Quine’s legacy.   
   Quine’s heirs are not just his faithful followers.  They are all whose work has 
been informed or whose problem space has been transformed by his positions.  They 
have  given  a  variety  of  answers.    Richard  Rorty’s  answer  to  the  first  question  is 
‘nothing’.  Philosophy, he believes is, like alchemy, a one problem field.  The discovery 
that base metal cannot be transmuted into gold leaves the the alchemist qua alchemist 
with nothing to do.  He should go out and get a job.  Similarly, the recognition that the 
project of philosophical analysis rests on a mistake leaves philosopher qua philosopher 
with nothing to do.  She too should go out and get a job.   
  Rorty’s former Princeton colleagues and their allies seem to share his view of the 
adverse  consequences  of  abandoning  the  dualisms.    Their  solution  was  to  retain  but   
unbraid them, thereby denying the interdependence that Soames describes.  Following 
Kripke, they maintain that necessity and a priority are not so tightly bound to analyticity 
as  once  was  thought.    If  this  is  so,  then  metaphysicians  can  continue  to  invoke  the 
necessary/contingent distinction and epistemologists can continue to invoke the a priori/a 
posteriori distinction, leaving philosophers of language to do what they will with the 
analytic/synthetic  distinction.    Moreover,  if  analyticity  does  not  have  to  underwrite 
necessity and a priority, it can limit its aspirations to explicating a few sentences where 
synonymy seems relatively unproblematic.  Then, insofar as Quine's arguments against 
the analytic/synthetic distinction are sound, all that they undermine is the explication of a 
small number of philosophically insignificant sentences like 'All bachelors are unmarried 
men.'  The recognition that linguists need to come up with a different semantics for 
'bachelor' does not pose a dire threat to the discipline.   
  Contemporary analytic metaphysics and contemporary epistemology are part of 
Quine’s legacy then because Quine’s challenges brought certain questions to the fore, and 
showed that the complacent conviction that necessity and a priority were unproblematic 
was unfounded.  Once it became clear that language alone would not ground them, the 
the stage was set for current appeals to intuitions.  Since these appeals are not backed by 
an account of why the intuitions in question are supposed to be trustworthy, this amounts 
to taking necessity and a priority as primitives.  Whether adopting such primitives is a 
promising strategy or a desperate rearguard action, the need for such a drastic expedients 
is part of Quine’s legacy.  Had he not problematized the project of analysis, they would 
not have been required. 
  As is well known, Quine maintained that the denial of the dualisms leads to the   
conclusion that philosophy is continuous with natural science.  Arguably, this licenses 
philosophers  such  as  Stephen  Stitch  and  Joshua  Greene  to  do  empirical  work.  
Experimental philosophy is born.  The question is whether what they are doing is still 
philosophy, or have they just moved over to empirical science instead?  Obviously the 
answer depends on what philosophy is. 
To  say  that  philosophy  is  continuous  with  natural  science  is  not  the  same  as 
saying that philosophy is identical to or is nothing but natural science.  Although visible 
light  is  continuous  with  the  rest  of  the  electromagnetic  spectrum,  there  is  something 
special about visible light.  Without resort to instrumentation, we are sensitive to it.  As a 
result, there are ways of investigating visible light that do not extend to the rest of the 
electromagnetic spectrum.  Analogously, philosophy might be continuous with natural 
science without thereby becoming nothing but natural science.  It might have methods, 
problems and approaches of its own that do not extend to the rest of natural science.     
One possibility is that its domain is second-order investigation.  Philosophers like 
Daniel Dennett and Peter Godfrey-Smith analyze evolutionary arguments to see what 
they show, what assumptions they rest on, how vulnerable they are to slight changes in 
background assumptions and so on.  They explain what such arguments do, and assess 
how well they do it and where they are vulnerable.  Philosophers like Hilary Putnam, 
Nancy Cartwright, and Arthur Fine analyze the bewildering pronouncements of quantum 
mechanics, and explain how to understand the world as composed of items that behave in 
the  strange  ways  quantum  mechanics  says  its  objects  behave.    Although  the  word 
‘analyze’ is used in describing their activities, there is, and need be, no commitment to 
the  idea  that  their  work  commits  them  to  analyticity.    They  simply  explicate  the   
commitments of the science – its laws and boundary conditions, evidence statements and 
rules of inference –  and show how they hang together, where the commitments clash and 
what they do and do not demonstrate.    
Empirical science rests on observation.  An attractive feature of the positivist 
picture was the idea that to each factual sentence there corresponds a class of possible 
observations which would confirm it.  That class of possible observations constituted the 
sentence’s meaning.  Just by understanding its meaning then, one would know what it 
would take to confirm it.  But the demise of the analytic/synthetic distinction discredits 
the  contention  that  the  meaning  of  a  sentence  is  (or  is  tightly  correlated  with)  its 
verification conditions.   
Nevertheless, one might hold out hope for sentence-by-sentence verification, if 
there were some other way to identify the observations that would separately confirm 
each  factual  sentence.    What  could  it  be?    Before  worrying  about  hard  cases  like 
‘electrons have negative charge’, consider a seemingly easier case: ‘That apple is red.’  
Numerous observation statements of the form ‘That apple looks red to me,’ ‘That apple 
looks red to Peter,’ ‘That apple looked red to Alex yesterday’, and so on contribute to its 
confirmation.  These, it might seem, underwrite what an ‘observation conditional’ which 
connects  the  observation  statements  with  the  factual  statement  they  are  supposed  to 
confirm: ‘If something looks red in suitable circumstances, it probably is red’.  But what 
justifies the observation conditional?  Well, investigators might have or get correlations 
which indicate that things that look red in one setting or to one person, typically look red 
in another, or to another.  If so, they have reason to think that its looking red is not a 
fluke.  They might also have a theory that tells them how things that are red typically   
look.  They might have information to the effect that the apple in question is a ripe 
McIntosh apple, and ripe McIntosh apples typically are red.  Then they have good reason 
to believe that the apple is red.  But notice that the original judgment is hostage, not just 
to the observation statements, but to the broader account.  What they are entitled to 
conclude is that if the background assumptions are sound and the observation statements 
are true, the apple is, or at least probably is, red . 
The same sort of story holds for ‘electrons have negative charge’, although a lot 
more complicated theory mediates between the claim and the evidence for it.  Still, if the 
complicated  theory  is  true  (or  true  enough),  a  certain  identifiable  set  of  observation 
statements confirm ‘electrons have negative charge’. ‘Our statements about the external 
world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body.’ 
(Quine, 41).  Rather than sentence-by-sentence verification, what result is total-theory 
verification.  An individual sentence is verified by belonging to a theory or account that is 
verified.   
The flip side, of course, is that when an account is not borne out, only the entire 
cluster of commitments has been discredited.  The disconfirmation does not by itself 
point to any particular commitment as the locus of the difficulty.  So any of a number of 
revisions could bring theory and observation into accord.  ‘Any statement can be held 
true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.’ 
(Quine, 43).  Quine's contention might seem too lax.  It suggests that an individual can 
hold to her claim, whatever it is, by dogmatically insisting that the error must lie outside 
of her purview.  Indeed, she can.  But such dogmatism has its price.  If she wants to hold 
a given sentence true, she is going to have to make the compensatory adjustments.  She   
cannot just insist, ‘I'm right about this!  The discrepancy is not my fault!’  If the price is 
too high, it is not worth paying.  Quine’s point is not that it is permissible to be dogmatic, 
but that there is no algorithm for assigning blame when something goes wrong.  When an 
observation is at odds with the background theory, scientists sometimes conclude the 
observation report is wrong; in other cases they conclude that the theory is flawed; in 
other cases, they judge that the experiment was poorly designed, or that the methods for 
evaluating their findings were flawed.  Similarly, when one part of a theory does not 
accord with another.  Quine considers such flexibility a strength rather than a weakness.  
It enables scientists to make adjustments that yield theories that are best on balance.   
  An example may bring this out.  ‘Inanimate objects are identical when their parts 
are identical’ is a principle that many metaphysicians consider necessary.  Those who 
believe in the a priori, might consider it a priori as well.  If so, it cannot be false and, 
independently of experience, anyone who understands it can tell that it cannot be false.  
Being a universal claim, it should hold for particles of a viscous fluid.  However, if it 
holds, then ‘F=ma’ does not.
   The reason is this:  The molecules in a viscous fluid move 
at  different  rates.    In  prototypical  applications  of    'F=ma',  forces  act  on  objects  like 
billiard balls that have some sort of integrity or boundary.  But in viscous fluids, the 
'forces' on the 'object' are the effects on momentum of molecules moving in and out of 
that  'object'.    So  preserving  'F=ma'  requires  continually  redefining  what  constitutes  a 
particle, letting different molecules comprise it at different times.
  Although physicists are 
willing to concede that  ‘F=ma’ does not hold at the quantum level or at relativistic 
speeds and distances, it is an extremely valuable law for characterizing the behavior of 
middle sized items in this neighborhood of the cosmos.  These include the viscous fluids   
flowing around here.  Fluid mechanics thus characterizes its particles so as to comport 
with the law.  Rather than insisting that all component molecules of a particle be the same 
from one instant to the next, they let the individual molecules come and go, but keep the 
average enclosed mass constant. (Wilson, 158-9).  ‘F=ma’, evidently, is a so central a law 
of  physics  that  scientists  are  willing  to  make  drastic  revisions  in  the  criteria  for  the 
identity of a fluid particle over time in order to preserve it.  In this case, the tension is 
acute.    One  way  or  another  a  major  revision  in  antecedently  plausible  principles  is 
needed.  Either scientists must revise a very reasonable metaphysical commitment about 
the identity of an object over time, or revise a fundamental law of physics.  Quine's  
philosophy readily accommodates the scientists' solution.  Most metaphysics does not.   
  The resolution is not a manifestation of stubbornness or dogmatism.  It is a matter 
of  charting  the  effects  of  different  revisions  on  an  overall  theory  of  the  world,  and 
assessing the costs and benefits of different potential revisions.  If they revise their views 
about the identity of a particle, scientists can retain the power of classical mechanics.  
That is something that they have a strong, and scientifically justified, incentive to do.  
‘Two Dogmas’ not only meshes with what science does in this case, it also affords an 
understanding of why the accommodation is scientifically reasonable.  
Science is a flexible network of cognitive commitments that, through continual  
adjustments, achieves an understanding of nature that is on balance reasonable.  None of 
its commitments is absolutely irrevisible.  But different potential revisions have different 
costs and benefits.  Here is where the pragmatic moment in Quine’s philosophy enters.  
To decide among potential revisions requires asking what science (or any other inquiry) 
is trying to do, what resources it has to draw on, and what limitations it currently faces, to   
decide among potential revisions.  There are multiple cognitive desiderata – simplicity, 
fecundity,  elegance,  predictive  power,  and  so  on.    Insofar  as  it  is  feasible,  revisions 
should  yield  a  theory  that  satisfies  them.    Moreover,  with  the  growth  of  knowledge,  
methods, standards, and values and goals evolve.  There emerge new understandings of 
how to find things out, what sorts of methods and results stand the test of time, what 
desiderata are worth pursuing, and when and how they might conflict.  Investigators no 
longer examine the entrails of birds to divine the future and theorists no longer appeal to 
the  gods  of  Homer  to  explain  phenomena,  not  because  such  methods  were  a  priori 
unwarranted, but because they discovered that such methods did not work very well and 
they developed other methods that work better.  That is what science does.  Quine’s 
legacy shows why it is a reasonable thing to do.  In so doing, it provides more than a 
sociology of science.  It affords the basis for a normative, second-order enterprise that 
evaluates the sort of understanding science purports to deliver and the standards it should 
satisfy.           
  Although Quine privileges science, he never argues that all that remains after the 
demise  of  the  dualisms  is  natural  science.    Stanley  Cavell  suggests  that  rather  than 
concluding that philosophy is continuous with natural science, it is preferable to conclude 
that philosophy is continuous with the rest of culture.  In that case, without relying on 
rigid divides or adopting a God’s eye view, philosophy can presumably contribute to the 
understanding of morality, the arts, social and political life, and so forth.  And just as the 
philosopher of science can reflect fruitfully on scientific practice, the moral philosopher, 
the political philosopher and the philosopher of art can reflect fruitfully on the practices 
in their respective domains.   
  To  make  anything  of  this  legacy  requires  accepting  Quine's  challenge.  
Philosophy can take a broad, deep view of the various cognitive and practical enterprises, 
ascertain patterns and discrepancies, and identify and assess the norms, standards and 
methods that are used.  ‘Two Dogmas’ brings philosophy into closer accord with the 
first-order theories and the phenomena it seeks to understand.  Philosophy used to purport 
to be judging from a ‘God’s eye view'.  But, besides being unachievable, that perspective 
was too distant from the realities of first-order theories and practices to be useful.  Quine 
brings philosophy down to earth (or at least into near-earth orbit). Philosophical theories 
can reflect and reflect on the sort of scientific, social, and aesthetic theories and practices 
that actually occur, rather than simply proclaiming from Olympus about what should be 
going on.  Everything is more precarious.  Theories, even the good ones, may not stand 
the test of time. But even if there is no assurance that they will or should be held true 
come what may, they may be enormously useful in understanding the world and the 
available ways understanding of the world here and now. 
 
Catherine Z. Elgin 
Harvard University 
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